Games with Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

Application to International Economics - Free Trade and Protection
Consider the game between the United States and Japan, each of who can choose free trade (strategy F) or protection (strategy P). The payoffs are as follows: If they both choose free trade, both countries gain by trade. [1] If they both choose protection, there is no gain for either country. [2] If only one country chooses protection, they will gain by protecting their domestic market while still trading in the other country's market. [3] As before, to consider strategies, consider the United States: If Japan chooses F, [4] then U.S. has a higher payoff with P. [5] If Japan choose P, [6] then U.S. has a higher payoff with P. [7] Thus, P is a dominant strategy for the U.S., and, by symmetry, also a dominant strategy for Japan. This leads to a dominant strategy equilibrium at (P, P). [8]
Analysis
The tragedy here is that, in the absence of any other information, both countries will choose the inferior but still dominant (P, P) when they could both gain by moving to (F, F). How can they reach (F, F)? Integration (co-operation) Negotiation (with penalties for reneging)

Application to International Economics - Free Trade and Protection